The mixed picture of extant research on the relationship between internal and external R&D prompts us to ask such a question: under what conditions is there complementarity or substitutability between different R&D strategies? The goal of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature by advancing and testing the contingency of the relationship between internal and external R&D strategies in shaping firms' innovative output. Using a panel sample of incumbent pharmaceutical firms covering the period 1986−2000, our empirical analysis suggests that the level of in-house R&D investments, which is characterized by decreasing marginal returns, is a contingency variable that critically influences the nature of the link between internal and external R&D strategies. In particular, internal R&D and external R&D, through either R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions, turn out to be complementary innovation activities at higher levels of in-house R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts internal and external R&D are substitutive strategic options. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and estimation techniques, including a dynamic perspective on firm innovative performance.
INTRODUCTION
The ability of firms to continually update their technological know-how and capabilities is becoming an imperative for competitive survival (Christensen, 2000; Foster and Kaplan, 2001 ).
In that context, firms can pursue multiple approaches to innovative renewal. One path is to develop and nurture in-house research and development (R&D) competencies. In technologybased industries, perhaps the most salient mechanism of firms' innovative renewal is investing in internal R&D (Knott and Posen, 2009 ). Another path is found in the use of external technology sourcing. Powell et al. (1998 Powell et al. ( , 1996 point out that in industries characterized by complex and rapidly expanding knowledge bases, the locus of innovative renewal lies within a broad ‗network' of learning rather than within the boundaries of individual firms (see also Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Edquist, 1997) . As a consequence, incumbent firms frequently need to leverage their external networks to source new technology and capabilities, especially within an emerging, new technological regime (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Kranenburg and Hagedoorn, 2008; NichollsNixon and Woo, 2003; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007) .
Recent years have witnessed more and more companies pursuing an ‗open innovation' (Chesbrough, 2003) strategy by leveraging internal and external knowledge flows in parallel to build and hone their innovative capabilities. Concurrent with the open innovation approach, a rather voluminous literature has emerged that examines the relationship between in-house R&D and external technology sourcing. At the heart of this literature is the discussion of the complementarity or substitutability between internal and external R&D strategies for managing innovation, a debate that has been accompanied by mixed empirical evidence 1 . On the one hand, 5 R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts internal and external R&D are substitutive strategic options.
The paper proceeds as follows. After an overview of the growing literature on internal and external R&D strategies of firms, we formulate the hypotheses to be tested. We then turn to methodology, describing the sample, the model, and the estimation techniques. The empirical results are presented in the next section, followed by a variety of robustness tests. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results and some implications for future research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
To the extent that R&D is an important, and perhaps even the most important, contributor to productivity growth and innovation (Griliches, 1979; Scherer, 1982) , the impact of R&D investments on firm innovation has attracted enormous attention in the literature. In their seminal work on the R&D-patents relationship, Hausman et al. (1984) maintain that, rather than the propensity to patent just declining exogenously over time, firms are getting less patents from their more recent R&D investments, implying a decline in the ‗effectiveness'or productivity of R&D.
The role of R&D in patenting, as a major indicator of innovation, has later on been studied extensively (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; Guo and Trivedi, 2002; Montalvo, 1997) , with the overall R&D elasticity of patents varying from 0.4 to 0.7 and thereby suggesting decreasing returns to scale (Gurmu and Perez-Sebastian, 2007) .
Amongst others, Griliches (1990) suggests that the estimates for R&D elasticity vary and depend on firm size, with larger firms showing a lower R&D productivity 2 (see also Acs and Audretsch, 1991) . In line with this thinking, Graves and Langowitz (1993) show that firms in the 6 pharmaceutical industry experience decreasing returns to scale in R&D as the level of their R&D expenditures rises. Their central argument is that innovative effectiveness decreases with increasing firm R&D investments and, by association, with firm size. Cohen and Klepper (1996) explain why larger firms can still prosper despite the lower average productivity of their R&D, as the greater output over which large firms can apply their R&D enables them to profit more from R&D than smaller firms, which leads them to undertake more R&D projects at the margin. A large number of recent studies examine the impact of firm R&D investments on innovation as well (e.g., Griffith et al., 2004; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Lokshin et al., 2008; Love and Roper, 2002; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007) and find diseconomies of scale in R&D in most cases.
The above leads us to a baseline hypothesis on the effect of internal R&D on innovative output, which is to be seen as a starting point for our analysis of the simultaneous interactions between different R&D strategies. Openness of firms to external knowledge sources is another key element for knowledge creation and innovation (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . A diverse set of studies emphasize that access to external R&D can be leveraged to enhance the efficiency of internal R&D investments. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) However, a number of other papers identifying the relationship between in-house and external sources of innovation have found a substitutability instead of a complementarity effect. Audretsch et al. (1996) suggest that internal and external R&D are substitutes in low-technology industries but not in high-technology industries. Blonigen and Taylor (2000) find a substantial inverse relationship between R&D intensity and acquisition activities among electronic and electrical equipment firms. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) 
METHODOLOGY

Research Setting
The research setting for testing our hypotheses is the global pharmaceutical industry, which is on the verge of profound mutations as a new biotechnology-based technological regime has emerged.
More in particular, we will focus on incumbent pharmaceutical companies attempting to build up innovative capabilities within this new technological regime. Incumbent pharmaceutical firms are defined as pharmaceutical firms that were in existence prior to the emergence of biotechnology.
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These companies, such as Bayer, Hoffmann-La Roche, Merck, and Pfizer, are generally mature and very large firms that dominated the industry since the 1940s. Since the mid 1970s, new biotechnology brought along significant scientific and technological breakthroughs in genetic engineering (recombinant DNA, 1973) and hybridization (monoclonal antibodies, 1975) . These advances have served as a radical process innovation for established pharmaceutical companies in the way new drugs are discovered and developed (Pisano, 1997) and they are even to affect the core capabilities needed to remain competitive (Nagarajan and Mitchell, 1998) . This development provides an ideal setting for us to explore how incumbents organize R&D strategies in their quest for innovation within a new technological regime.
Data and Sample
We use data from several major sources. All financial data were converted to U.S. dollars and inflation-adjusted.
To mitigate a potential survivor bias, we started with a comprehensive set of global pharmaceutical firms alive in 1986 according to various industry sources 8 . In this manner we identified 89 incumbent pharmaceutical firms, defined as pharmaceutical firms that were in existence prior to the emergence of biotechnology in the mid 1970s. We then proceeded with a family tree analysis 9 on each of the 89 firms for the 1986-2000 time period. Through this analytical process, 6 horizontal mergers and acquisitions were ascertained among the incumbent pharmaceutical firms. As a horizontal merger or acquisition took place, we added to the survivor the historical data of the acquired company (i.e. the inactive) and then tracked the surviving entity forward 10 . Such scrutiny procedure ultimately renders a slightly unbalanced panel sample of 83 firms covering the 15-year period from 1986 to 2000 (i.e., 1139 firm-year observations).
7 CATI only collects cooperative agreements in which a combined innovative activity or an exchange of technology is engaged by at least two industrial partners. The first phase of data collection is described in Hagedoorn (1993) , Duysters and Hagedoorn (1993) . 8 To draw the sample for this study we tracked Compustat, Datastream, Amadeus, SIC reports, Ernst and Young's Annual Biotech Industry Reports, Scrip's Pharmaceutical Yearbook, amongst others. 9 For the rationale for constructing family trees, see Rothaermel and Hess (2007) . When firms were acquired by outsiders, they were included as unbalanced data. A variety of industry sources were checked throughout the family tree analysis, including Compustat/Standard and Poor's, Encyclopedia, and company homepage.
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It is important to indicate that while we collected patent data until the end of 2003, we purposefully ended the study in 2000 to overcome a potential right truncation bias. This measure was taken in that all patent data used in the study are based upon patent applications granted, and the application date is only reported when the patent is actually granted. A grant lag as such is generally three years after the patent was originally applied for 11 (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2008) . In contrast, there is essentially no lag time between the completed invention and the patent application date, which is on average no more than three months (Darby and Zucker, 2003) . Thus, the application date of a granted patent is closely tied to the timing of the new knowledge creation and should be used as the relevant time placer for patents (Hall et al., 2001; Trajtenberg, 1990) .
Measures
Dependent Variable
Innovative Output We focus on the patenting frequency, i.e., the number of annual biotechnology patents (Biotech Patents) granted to incumbent pharmaceutical firms to proxy for their innovative output within the new technological regime. Annual patent counts are generally accepted as one of the most appropriate indicators that enable researchers to compare the inventive or innovative output of companies in terms of new technologies, new processes, and new products (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003) . Patents are directly related to inventiveness methods are used to account for mergers and acquisitions, the -purchase method‖ and the -pooling of interest method‖. In this study we principally followed the -purchase method‖ since this is the way that the majority of mergers and acquisitions are accounted for. In June 2001 the Financial Accounting Standard Board eliminated the -pooling of interest‖ and requires that all business combinations be accounted for by the -purchase method‖ (FASB Statement 141). 11 The USPTO evaluates patent applications and grants patents. Patents usually last 20 years from the date on which the patent application is filed (not when it is issued). Thus, the enforceable term of a patent is between 17 and 20 years; exactly how long depends on how long the application is under PTO review (i.e., the grant lag). The PTO provides a three-year period for the agency to issue a patent. (Walker, 1995) , and represent an externally validated measure of technological novelty (Griliches, 1990) . Studies also show that patents are well-correlated with other indicators of innovative output (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Stuart, 2000) .
Independent Variables
Internal R&D We measure a pharmaceutical company's internal R&D investments by its R&D expenditures. As highlighted in prior research, R&D expenditures are primarily taken as an input indicator of a firm's efforts in establishing R&D that might eventually lead to innovative output (Griliches, 1990 (Griliches, , 1998 Hitt et al., 1997) . R&D efforts can also signal innovative competences that are found to affect the performance of companies, particularly in hightechnology industries (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; Graves and Langowitz, 1993; Griffith et al., 2004; Griliches, 1990; Guo and Trivedi, 2002; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Hall et al., 1986; Hausman et al., 1984; Lokshin et al., 2008; Montalvo, 1997; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007 
Control Variables
Presample Innovation In all models we attempted to capture the unobserved heterogeneity in firm innovation. As stressed by Blundell et al. (1995) , the ‗permanent' capabilities of companies to successfully commercialize new products and processes should be reflected in the pre-sample history of innovative output. Hence, we included both the pre-sample average patent count (i.e., the average number of biotech patents by the firm in the period from 1974 15 to 1985) and a dummy (1 = if the firm had ever innovated prior to 1986) 16 to proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity in the innovation models of incumbent pharmaceutical firms (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002 Firm Nationality To control for country-specific institutional configurations that are significant in shaping patenting propensities (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999) 
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The global nature of our dataset is reflected in the fact that 36% of the firms are U.S. based, 28%
are European based, with the remaining 36% headquartered in Japan.
Firm Size Previous work has examined how factors associated with firm size impact on a firm's incentive to invest in R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Schumpeter, 1942; Teece, 1982 Teece, , 1992 . Moreover, firm size has been shown to exert a direct effect on innovative output (Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Freeman and Soete, 1997) . Researchers also observe that small firms are more likely to restrict themselves to a simple innovation strategy, whereas large firms tend to combine various R&D sources (Beneito, 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 1999) . We thus controlled for firm size by taking into account the total number of employees (Employees). The average number of employees of individual firms is 28,970, suggestive of their large size.
Firm Performance Previous research suggests that there is a trade-off between the size of a firm and its performance (Cubbin and Leech, 1986; Dobson and Gerrard, 1989; Reid, 1993 Reid, , 1995 . Companies with higher performance may as well be better positioned to finance their R&D investments. These influences were captured by including Net Income and Total Revenues 17 in the regression analysis to allow for financial status of large pharmaceutical companies.
Year Fixed Effects
In order to control for factors other than firm-specific characteristics that may influence all firms, such as economic-wide changes, we inserted year dummies, with 2000
being the reference year.
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Estimation Technique
The dependent variable of this study, innovative output, as measured by biotech patent counts, is a count variable taking only non-negative integer values. To model count data the linear exponential or log-link family is a good alternative (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) . On account of the overdispersion phenomenon displayed by patent counts, namely the preponderance of zero
and small values of firm patenting, the negative binomial estimation provides a better fit for the data than the more restrictive Poisson model (Hausman et al., 1984) .
The common first moment condition for the negative binomial model is,
In our innovation model, we write as (2) where λ it is the expectation value of biotech patent counts for firm i in period t, RD I and RD I 2 are R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures squared, respectively, RD E represents the dummy variable of external R&D through R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions, Control n is a vector of control variables, and the parameters β, θ, γ are coefficients of various explanatory variables. A one-period lag is employed on all explanatory (key and control) variables to alleviate a potential simultaneity bias.
Differentiating equation (1) with respect to RD I and dividing both sides of the resulting equation by λ it yields,
The expected marginal innovative output is herein given by the relative change 18 in λ it associated with a one unit change in RD I . We then differentiate equation (3) with respect to RD I a second time,
The above model explains the concavity of marginal returns to internal R&D, indicating whether there are decreasing returns (i.e., concave whenever or ) or increasing returns (i.e., convex whenever or ) to scale in internal R&D. Further, the existence of an interactive effect between RD I and RD E is defined by requiring that the relative change in λ it associated with a change in RD I depends on RD E and vice versa (Winkelmann, 2008) . Differencing equation (3) 
Equation ( 18 See the interpretation of parameters in the Poisson regression by Winkelmann (2008, p.70) . 19 Mullahy (1999) discusses the difficulties that arise if interactive effects in nonlinear models are defined in terms of absolute, rather than relative, changes. In our model the interactive effects under absolute change would be otherwise as complicated as follows,
In our count panel data model, either fixed or random effects specification can, in theory, be used to control for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 2003) . One difficulty with the random effects specification is its underlying assumption that time invariant unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with regressors of interest. In other words, this specification rules out the existence of time invariant unobserved factors that influence both a firm's R&D strategies and its innovative output, which is untenable since managers make their ‗strategic' organizational choices with certain performance expectations in mind (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Leiblein et al., 2002) . Hence, we used the fixed-effects specification so as to estimate the model parameters consistently (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Winkelmann, 2008) . Additionally, following Blundell et al. (1995 Blundell et al. ( , 2002 , we allowed for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity by explicitly taking into account the pre-sample history of firm innovative output. 20 As mentioned previously, factors associated with firm size tend to influence a firm's incentive to invest in R&D (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Schumpeter, 1942; Teece, 1982 Teece, , 1992 . In addition, employees and total revenue, as close measures of firm size, are also highly correlated in our dataset (r = 0.80).
RESULTS
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of 10 (Cohen et. al., 2003) , implying that multicollinearity does not pose a problem for our estimation models.
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Insert Table 1 about here   Table 2 provides results for all models using fixed-effects negative binomial estimation.
Model 1 is the baseline specification including the control variables only. Model 2 estimates R&D expenditures and the quadratic terms thereof. Model 3 presents the full model with the interactive effects between internal and external R&D. Each subsequent model demonstrates a significant (p < 0.001) improvement over the baseline specification. We use the full Model 3 to discuss the regression results of the hypothesis tests. Overall, the estimated coefficients suggest a curvilinear relationship between R&D expenditures and biotech patenting. The estimated second derivative, 2θ 2 when RD E = 0 given by equation (4), is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.001). By comparison, when RD E = 1, the estimated second derivative, 2θ 2 + 2θ 23 given by equation (4), becomes less negative (and significant at p < 0.10), implying that marginal returns to internal R&D decrease less in the presence of external R&D. Taken together, these results provide strong support for hypothesis 1 that there are decreasing returns to scale in internal R&D.
Firm innovative output initially increases with investment in internal R&D, this rate of increase diminishes at higher levels of internal R&D spending though. This finding is consistent with previous studies clearly suggesting diseconomies of scale in internal R&D (Graves and 21 As an additional test, we centered the independent variables before creating their squares and cross products (Cohen, 2003) . The estimated coefficients turned out to show a very similar empirical pattern. Besides, even if multicollinearity does not bias coefficient estimates, it may affect the stability of the estimated coefficients, thereby omitting even a few observations can change the sign or the significance of the affected variables (Greene, 2003) . To ensure the robustness of our results, we performed a sensitivity analysis by drawing random samples of 90% of the total observations and estimating the full model for each of these random samples (Ahuja and Katila, 2001 ). The corresponding results are similar to the results reported below.
20 Langowitz, 1993; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Lokshin et al., 2008; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007) .
Insert Table 2 about here
In hypothesis 2, we postulated that internal and external R&D strategies may reinforce or substitute for each other in predicting firms' innovative output. We tested the interactive effect between internal and external R&D by examining the sign and statistical significance of the values of the cross-partial derivative, given by equation (5). To this purpose, a graphical analysis, as exhibited in Figure 1 , was conducted to manifest the nature and significance of the interactive effect by plotting its value and the implied z-statistic value over the range of internal R&D investments by incumbent pharmaceutical firms (Ai and Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009 ). In Figure 1 , the bullet symbols ( • ) depict values of the interactive effect between internal and external R&D, recorded on the left axis, while the diamond shaped symbols ( ◊ ) depict z-statistic values, recorded on the right axis. As seen in Figure 1 , the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the interactive effect varies with the level of in-house R&D. The interactive effect is negative and significant (p < 0.10) when internal R&D is less than 886.14, whereas the effect is positive and significant (p < 0.10) when internal R&D is in the range from about 1364.34 to 2689.31, with the interactive effect not statistically significant in between. These findings highlight the complexity of understanding the relationship between internal and external R&D strategies in shaping firms' innovative performance, and clear-cut results, either complementarity (hypothesis 2-a) or substitutability (hypothesis 2-b), are not always to be expected. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our overall findings suggest that a 21 complete picture is to be found in the contingency of the relationship between internal and external R&D strategies, where complementarity or substitutability is contingent on the level of in-house R&D.
Insert Figure1 about here
Turning to the effects of control variables, we found largely consistent results across various models. The pre-sample patent variables, i.e., pre-sample mean patent count and the dummy, are both positive and statistically significant, indicating that it is important to control for the unobserved differences in the innovative capabilities with which firms entered our sample. 1993 -1999) , in contrast with its earlier years (1986 -1992) .
To ensure the robustness of our results presented above, we also ran models including a measure of firm knowledge stock 22 , effectively a lagged dependent variable, to partially control for firmspecific unobserved heterogeneity that is not fixed throughout time (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005) . Since the lagged dependent variable is predetermined, the conditional maximum likelihood estimator for count panel data models is inconsistent (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; Montalvo, 1997; Wooldridge, 1997) . Following Blundell et al. (1995 Blundell et al. ( , 2002 , we used the pre-sample mean (PSM) estimator 23 , which is a good alternative to standard estimators when there are predetermined regressors. The results under PSM estimation are reported in the first and third columns of Table 3 . These estimated results set a very similar pattern as what we observed in Table 2 . The additional message is that pharmaceutical firms with higher knowledge stock exhibit a significantly greater number of biotechnology patents (p < 0.001). The strong effects of presample dummy and firm merged, though, are driven into insignificance in this dynamic analysis.
Furthermore, as our study focuses on a dummy, rather than a count, variable of external R&D, we disaggregate external R&D into R&D alliances and R&D acquisitions so as to capture the scale of different types of external R&D investments. The corresponding results are shown in the last two columns of Table 3 . Both estimation methods -fixed-effects negative binomial and PSM -produce fairly close findings to those presented before. The robust empirical patterns overall suggest that the complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and R&D 22 See Blundell et al. (1995) , knowledge stock (K it ) is the depreciated sum of past innovations and defined as, K it = Y it + (1-δ) K it-1 where the depreciation rate δ is taken to be 30%, Y it is biotech patent in our models. 23 Another alternative in the case of predetermined regressors is the quasi-differenced GMM estimator, which can however be severely biased in small samples, particularly when regressors are highly persistent and the instruments are therefore weak predictors of the endogenous variables in the differenced model (Blundell et al., 2002). 23 alliances, or between internal R&D and R&D acquisitions, is contingent on the level of in-house R&D investments. The only noteworthy difference between these two methods of estimation, fixed-effects negative binomial and PSM, is that R&D acquisitions exhibit more significant interactive effects with internal R&D under PSM estimation. In sum, these results corroborate our findings from the more parsimonious models of Table 2 .
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A substantial body of literature has examined the relationship between internal R&D and external technology sourcing through external R&D, so far focusing on either complementarity or substitutability. Yet there is still considerable confusion over the conditions under which there may in fact be complementarity or substitutability between different R&D strategies. Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) , success in innovation will depend not only on combing various innovation activities, but also on creating the right context. 24 The potential benefits from complementarity are therefore context-specific or contingent. One implication of our analysis is that the level of in-house R&D investments, which is characterized by decreasing marginal returns, is a contingency variable that critically influences the nature of the link between internal and external R&D strategies. In particular, internal R&D and external R&D, through R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions, are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of inhouse R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts internal and external R&D are substitutive strategic options.
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In line with the two roles, or faces, of in-house R&D 25 Levinthal, 1989, 1990 ), a minimum level of absorptive capacity, derived from in-house R&D activities, is required for effectively incorporating external R&D (Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2007; Lokshin et al., 2008; Tsai and Wang, 2008) . Higher levels of internal R&D investments, as a consequence, may enable incumbent firms to maintain their ability to react adequately to technological changes by leveraging external networks. As Arora and Gambardella (1990) demonstrate in the context of pharma-biotechnology, large pharmaceutical firms with higher internal research activities are more active in using external knowledge sources. In this light, sufficient investments in in-house R&D contribute substantially to a spiral of success and thereby sustainable innovative capabilities. By contrast, at lower levels of in-house R&D investments, our findings point to the idea that the simultaneous pursuit of internal R&D and external R&D sourcing strategies would actually decrease a firm's innovative output, at least at the margin. Part of the explanation may lie in the fairly constrained resource set of firms, especially in terms of their absorptive capacity, as a firm may fail to reap economies of scope when ineffectively scanning, selecting, and assimilating external technological knowledge. Alternatively, incumbent firms with low research capabilities tend to exhibit overreliance on external R&D alliances or acquisitions for promising technologies in the face of radical technological change. This would explain, to a certain extent, why some established pharmaceutical firms are obtaining or choose to obtain their most technologically advanced projects from alliance partners or through the market for know-how.
In attempting to characterize the contingency of the relationship between internal and external R&D strategies in shaping firms' innovative output, a number of econometric problems arising from the count panel nature of the data have to be considered. In essence, we adopted an 25 estimation approach that places the simultaneous interactions between internal R&D and two alternative modes of external R&D investments, R&D alliances and R&D acquisitions 26 , at the core of our analysis. It is readily apparent that firms do not randomly choose a specific way to organize R&D, either rely exclusively on in-house R&D or systematically combine with R&D alliances and/or R&D acquisitions. The effects that drive firms to choose ex ante a specific R&D strategy towards superior performance outcomes 27 , when not corrected for, would introduce a serious endogeneity bias 28 (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Leiblein et al., 2002) . Possible remedies are available, nevertheless, if endogeneity is caused by time invariant correlated unobserved heterogeneity, for which one can estimate the model parameters consistently by fixed effects panel data methods (Winkelmann, 2008) . Accordingly, we employed fixed effects specification in our panel count data models. In addition, to partially control for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity that is not fixed throughout time (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005) , a dynamic analysis was performed by taking into account the measure of firm knowledge stock.
So far the inconsistent literature on the complementarity or substitutability between R&D strategies, as emphasized by Watkins and Paff (2009) , leaves considerable room for improving the consistency in defining and measuring complementarity, particularly at the boundaries 26 In some cases large pharmaceutical firms also hope to establish a ‗preferential link' with the new biotechnology venture by acquiring part of its capital stocks. Such acquisition of minority stocks would likely translate into a formal alliance agreement once a specific new discovery needs to be implemented and possibly commercialized (Arora and Gambardella, 1990) . 27 Understanding how firms choose ex ante a specific way to organize R&D is beyond the scope of our study. 28 Another concern is the sample selection bias. A varied set of sample selection models are available in econometric literature to deal with such self-selection bias -the foremost model being Heckman two-stage approach. However, while Heckman and similar approaches are most commonly used within the domain of continuous-response models, they are not appropriate for count response models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Hilbe, 2007) . The development of methodology in count panel data models to correct for sample selection bias is unfortunately still an open task (Winkelmann, 2008 (Mittra, 2007 ). An interesting avenue for future work would be to investigate these issues, for instance, through a fine-grained analysis of firm's optimal balance between internal and external R&D strategies at various stages of innovation process or towards different types of innovation. We believe that a fuller appreciation of the origins of innovativeness is to be found in a better understanding of the alignment between R&D strategies and the internal and external environment of firms, be it in either a high-technology or a low-technology industry. 29 In the standard economic literature, partial substitution elasticity among inputs theoretically measures the relative change in the ratio of inputs when their relative prices change. By contrast, a very different measure is recently used in the management literature, comparing changes in average output ratios under different combinations of inputs. For the latter measure input prices play no role, nor do margins (Watkins and Paff, 2009 
